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TAYLOR V. MURPHY.
SYLLABUS.
Mechanics' Liens-Right ofSib-ContradortofileLiet.-The decision
in Shroeder v. Galland, 134 Pa., 277, that where the contractor has stip-
ulated that no lien shall be filed, the sub-contractor is bound by the stip-
ulation and has no right of lien, approved. Such an agreement violates
no rule of public policy. A statute that should disregard its obligation
and authorize the entry of a lien for work or materials in violation of its
terms would seem to be within the prohibition of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, Art. x, 17, which declares that no law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts shall be passed. It might also be within the limita-
tion on the powers of the several States, found in ArL i, io, of the Con-
stitution of the United States.
But there is no waiver of the right to enter a lien or covenant that
none shall be entered, where the contractor has merely agreed "to re-
lease and discharge the said houses from the operation of all liens, either
for materials furnished, or work done in the construction of the same."
It is no defence against the lien of a sub-contractor that the building
was erected under a written contract, in which the contractor was bound
to provide all materials and labor and complete the building, for a fixed
sum, to be paid when the building was finished; and that he did not
finish it.
A sub-contractor or material-man is entitled to a lien for what his
materials or labor are reasonably worth, although the aggregate of the
liens against the building is greater than the contract price.
A general allegation in an affidavit of defence in a suit on a mechan-
ics' lien, that the materials for which the lien is filed-were not such as
the contract required, is insufficient.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A sci. fa. having been issued on the lien filed by the
plaintiffs, who had furnished materials for the house in
question upon the order of the contractor, the owner filed
an affidavit of defence, which the Court below held insuffi-
cient and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. Defendant
appealed, specifying for error this action of the Court.
The other facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.'
1 Reported in 30 Weekly Notes, 27; 1 Adv. Rep., 54o.
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WILLIAMS, J., April I, I89 2.-The plaintiff furnished
lumber and manufactured woodwork, for the erection of
defendant's dwelling-house, on the order or direction of
Christy, the contractor. The mechanic's lien, on which
the writ of scirefadas in this case is issued, was entered for
the amount of material so furnished. The defendant in-
terposed an affidavit of defence, in which several reasons;
were urged as sufficient to prevent the entry of a judgment
and carry the case to ajury for trial. These may be stated
as follows:
(I) That the house was erected under a written contract,.
in which Christy was bound to provide all material and
labor, and complete the house, for the sum of $3,750, to
be paid when the building was finished; that he did- not
finish it, and for that reason nothing was due to him or
to a sub-contractor under him.
(?) That the aggregate amount of the liens entered.
against the building, together with the cost of completing
it, would exceed the contract price, and that the liens, if
sustained, should abate proportionably, in order to bring
the total cost down to the contract price.
(3) That no liens could be entered, under the express.
stipulations of the contract with Christy, the builder.
(4) That the material furnished was not such as the
contract required, and, in consequence of its defective
character, the house was worth $125 less than it otherwise
would have been, for which sum, at least, there was a good
defence.
It is urged that the principle announced in Schroeder
v. Galland' is broad enough to cover all the propositions
contained in the affidavit, and makes a reversal of the
judgment entered in the Court below necessary. In
Weaver v. Sheeler,2 we held that all persons furnish-
ing labor or materials for the erection of a building
were bound to take notice of the title of the apparent
owner. If he was an iitruder without right, the lien of
'1x34Pa., 277. 2J18 Pa., 634.
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contractor and sub-contractor must alike fall. If he held an
equitable title only,. the lien would bind such title as he
had, and no more. In Schroeder v. Galland, we went a
step further, and held that, where the contractor had stipu-
lated that no lien should be filed, he could not confer a
right upon his sub-contractor that he did not possess. The
contract between the owner and the contractor is the
source from which the right of the sub-contractor is derived
under the provisions of the law, and it is self-evident that
a stream cannot rise higher than its source. The agree-
ment of the builder, to provide all the labor and materials
for the erection of a building, and look for his security
solely to the personal responsibility of the owner, leaving
the building unincumbered by liens, is a valid and binding
one. It violates no rule of public policy. A statute that
should disregard its obligation, and authorize the entry of
a lien for work or materials, in violation of its terms, would
seem to be within the prohibition of the Constitution, Art.
i, section 17, which declares that no law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed. It might also *be
within the limitation on the powers of the several. States,
found in Art. i, section io, of the Constitution of the
United States. We are thorougtily satisfied, therefore,
with Schroeder v. Galland, and our only inquiry is,
whether this case falls within the rule there laid down.'
The third ground of defence, stated in the affidavit,
puts the case in the precise condition of Schroeder v.
Galland; but, on turning to the clause in the contract re-
lied on to raise the question, it will be seen that it is in-
sufficient. It contains the express promise of the con-
tractor, " to release and discharge the said houses from the
operation of all liens, either for materials furnished, or
work done in the construction of the same." This is not
a waiver of the right to enter alien, or a covenant that none
shall be entered. It is merely a promise to release and*"
discharge "such liens aq may be entered, prior to the day
when payment in full shall be made to the contractor." He
cannot demand the payment of the balance due upon his
contract until lie has performed the undertaking to release
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and discharge the liens that may have been entered against
the building. This does not fall within the rule invoked.
Neither do the first and second grounds of the defence.
It would be unreasonable to require one who was called
on to furnish material for the foundation or walls of a
house, to anticipate the cost of all the materials to be
furnished by- others, and of all the labor to be done, in
order to the full completion of the structure. He can
know, and he must take notice, as we have seen, of the
title of the apparent owner, and of the general characterof
the agreement under which the contractor is proceeding to
build. He can know, and must take notice of the general
character of the building, and of the materials and labor
proper to be used in its construction. He must see to it
that the materials he supplies are such as may be reason-
ably needed for, and used about, such a building, both as to
their quantity and quality; but here his responsibility ends.
Subject to these qualifications and conditions he may bind
the building for what his materials or labor may be reason-
ably worth.
This brings us to the last position taken by the de-
fendant, viz., that he is entitled to set off the sum of $125
upon the plaintifPs demand, for the reason that the ma-
terials were not such as the contract required. The only
provision in the contract on which this averment can rest,
is that which follows: "The construction, workmanship
and materials furnished are to be similar to that used and
performed in conitruction of house No. 139 Lafayette Street,
Germantown." The materials furnished by the plaintiff
included doors, sash, shutters and ornamental woodwork,
as well as flooring, shingles, joists and other rough lumber,
amounting in the aggregate to nearly $9oo. If the affidavit
had alleged a deficiency in the quality of the doors, or any
other portion of the materials furnished, as compared with
similar materials used in No. "139 Lafayette Street, a
different question would have been raised. As it is, the
allegation of a deficiency in quality relates to the mate-
rials generally, 'and the extent of the deficiency is measured,
not by a difference in the value of the articles furnished as
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compared with those contracted for, but by an alleged
difference in the value of the house as a whole, on account
of defectiveness in thematerial generally. The Court below
was right in treating this averment as altogether too
general.
Judgment affirmed.
MECHANICS' LIENS.
The Penna. Act of June i6th,
1836, P. L., 696; Purdon, 1157,
enacts that "every building erected
.... shall be subject to a lien for
the payment of all debts contracted
for work done, or materials 'fur-
nished for or about the erection or
construction of the same." "Every
person entitled to such lien shall
file a claim or statement of his de-
mand, in the office of the prothono-
tary of the court of common pleas
of the county in which the building
may be situate;" which claim must
set forth, inter alia, "the names of
the party claimant and of the owner
or reputed owner of the building,
and also of the contractor, architect
or builder, where the contract of the
claimant was made with such con-
tractor, architect or builder;" also,
"the amount or sum claimed to be
due, and the nature or kind of the
work done, or the kind and amount
of materials furnished, and the time
when the materials were furnished,
or the work was done, as the case
may be." There is no provision
for the filing or recording of the
contract between the owner and the
general contractor; nor any'state-
ment that the claims of the mater-
ial-man or sub-contractor shall in
any way be subject to the terms of
the contract between the owner
and the general contractor.
Probably in consequence of the
decision in Haley v. Prosser, 8
W. & S., 134, that a special agree-
ment under all circumstances de-
prives the party of his lien, and
that it is only when there is no
agreement in which the terms of
the bargain are particularly stated
that the mechanic is supposed to
c6ntract on the basis of the law and
rely upon the lien for his security,
the Act of April 16th, 1845, P. L.,
538, Purdon, page iI6o, pl. i9, was
passed, which eracts as follows:
"It is hereby declared that the
provisions of the Act approved June
I6th, 1836, entitled 'an Actrelating
to the lien of mechanics and others
upon .buildiugs' according to the
true intent and meaning thereof,
extend to and embrace claims for
labor done and materials furnished
and used in erecting any house or
other building, which may have
been or shall be erected under or
in pursuance of any contract or
agreement for the erection of the
same, and the provisions of the said
Act shall be so construed; and no
claim, which has been or may be
filed against any house or other
building or the lien thereof, or any
proceedings thereon shall be in any
manner affected by reason of any
contract having been entered into
for the erection of such building,
but the same shall be held hs good
and valid as if the building had
not been erected by contract."
In Young v. Lyman in 9 Pa. St.,
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449, decided in 1848, Young filed a
lien against Lyman for work done
under a written contract for the
erection of certain houses, in which
contract there was a clause as fol-
lows: "All materials to be paid
for four months after the com-
pletion of the job, and Young to
give security in $5oo that no lien
shall be entered on the houses ;"
which stipulation the Court ruled
to be "that no other person or
sub-contractor shall file a lien,"
and that Young was therefore en-
titled to his lien. In i88o, in the
case of Long v. Caffery, 93 Pa. St.,
526, Long expressly stipulated
"that no mechanic's or other lien
shall be entered against said build-
ing by the said Long or the material
contractor or workmen." The
court decided that Long had waived
his right of lien, and that this
agreement on his part was not de-
pendent upon a covenant by the
owner to insure the building and
a-sign the policy of insurance to
Long as collateral security. In
i888 the ease of Scheid v. Rapp,
121 Pa. St., 593, came before the
Court. Here the contract con-
tained the following provision:
"And the said Dionis Rapp hereby
for himself, his heirs, executors
and administrators (covenants) that
he will not suffer or permit 'to be
filed in the Court of Common
Pleas of Lancaster County any
mechanics' lien or liens against
the said building for the period of
six months after its completion."
It was argued that under the decis-
ion of Young v. Lyman, supra,
Rapp had not waived his right of
lien ; but the Supreme Court held
that he had, saying: "The sole
question is whether the contractor
by his covenant waived the right to
file, or authorize a lien to be filed,
in his own favor. We think he
did. While the phraseology of the
stipulation is different from that
of Long v. Caffery, 93 Pa., 526, the
legal effect of both is the same.
The lien under consideration was
necessarily filed by the plaintift
below, himself, or by his sufferance
or permission. In either case, it
was as clearly a violation of his
covenant as if he had suffered or
permitted any mechanic or mate-
rial-man to file a lien." Young v.
Lyman was not cited by the Court,
but may be considered to have been
overruled by this decision.
The case of Campbell v. Schaife
was decided by the District Court
of Allegheny County, in I85r, and
is reported in I Phila., 187. In this
case a lien was filed by sub-contrac-
tors, andthe owners filed, interalia,
a plea "That the debt claim ought
not to be levied on said house, be-
cause the plaintiffs were sub-con-
tractors under one James Millinger
(impleaded with the owners), who
had undertaken to erect said house
for the owners, and to furnish ma-
terials, and to receive payment
therefor partly in merchandise and
piartly in money, in one, two and
three years after the completion of
the building; concluding with an
averment of readiness, verification
and prayer forjudgment, etc." The
Court decided that this plea was
vicious in not stating specifically
the amounts to be paid in goods and
money respectively, and the kind
of goods and times of payment;
and that it was a plea in bar and
not in suspension of the remedy;
that it should have been a plea in
abatement, postponing the right to
a sci. fa. on the lien; the Court say-
ing: "The best position in which
the owners of the building can ask
to be placed, is to consider them as
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having made the contract them-
selves with the sub-contractor, as
to the time and mode of payment.
Surely the lien law is broad enough
in its terms to allow alien even with
a stipulated mode ofpayment. The
lien law then stands as security for
the payment in this mode: aud not
until a failure thus to pay, does the
party acquire a right to the remedy
by sci.fa., and then he may claim
a judgment for the payment in
money.- . . . Even on a lien,
payable by instalments, part of
which may not .be due, I see no
great difficulty in framing the plead-
ings, verdict, andjudgment in such
a manner that the contract shall be
enforced according to its terms.
Nor does the difficulty seem .insur-
mountable where part o. the sus-
pended payments are to be made in
goods." LOwarn, J., further said,
that as the informality of the plea
might readily be amended, and the
counsel had-discussed the question
which would have to be decided if
it were a plea in abatement, he
would take up that question: "Are
sub-contractors in the &ection of a
house affected, as to the time and
mode of payment, by the contract
made between the owners and the
builder?
"The law creates a lien for all
debts contracted for work done and
materials furnished for the erec-
tion of the house; and this phraseol-
ogy proves that this lien, like all
analogous liens, is founded on con-
tract express or implied. And here,
contrary to the rule as to other -
liens, the law, in another clause,
gives a lien even iV favor of a sub-
contractor. On what principle is it
founded?
"It must be on contract with the
owner, either directly or indirectly;
for it is only thus that one man can
acquire a claim upon theprop-
erty of another. And in this way
the connection is plain. The owner
contracts with 4t builder to erect a
house on certain terms, and the
builder makes a sub-contract with
a material-man to supply the mate-
rials. The claim of relationship
consists of but two links, the second
of which hangs by the first, and will
bear no greater weight The sub-
contractor comes in by reason of his
direct contract relation to thebuild-
er, and the right of lien of the
former for his claim, is, fatensto,
substitutionary to that of the latter.
As against the owner, the terms of
the principal contract, and, as
against the builder, the terms of
the sub-contract, limit and qualify
the lien of the sub-contractor, so as
topreventhis claim fromabatingthe
terms of either contract. And it is
-because the lien of the sub-contrac-
tor is by way of abrogation to the
right of the builder, that the latter
is made a party to the proceeding.
"The justice of this limitation of
the iight of the sub-contractor is
very plain; for, if it were otherwise,
no man could ever build a house
with any certainty as to the cost of
it, unlesshe employed all the work-
men, and purchased all the materi-
als himself. He might find it built
of an entirely different character
from that contracted for, and yet
have to pay the sub-contractor,
though the builder could have no
claim upon him. He might con-
tract for a house at $i,oo and find
liens established against it for
$2,OO.
"If such were the case, no pru-
dent man would make a contract to
have a house erected, except with a
builder who had ample means to
secure him against liens, and such
men only could obtain the most de-
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sirable contracts. The allowance
of any lien at all to a sub-contractor
is a special privilege, granted only
in case of buildings; and it is not
unreasonable to require him to look
to the principal contract, to ascer-
tain whether it is such as to justify
him in becoming a contractor under
it.
"The argument that the law and
the principal contract make the
builder the agent of the owner,
proves nothing. Suppose the fact
to be so; still his agency is only
special, limited by the terms of the
contract. He is to employ men to
build the house in the manner and
on the terms there indicated. For
anything beyond that he exceeds
his authority and does not bind his
principal. If, under a contract to
build a brick dwelling-house, he
erects a wooden stable, I do not
see how he or his sub-contractor
can claim any lien. Yet the latter
could do so, if the sub-contract were
not dependent on the principal one.
"To construe the law as is con-
tended for by the plaintiffs, would
be to place the owner in the rela-
tion of a protector to all those who
contribute to the erection of the
house. But the law treats every
man as capable of taking care of
himself. It constitutes no relation
of protection or dependence among
men who have arrived at legal dis-
cretion. It looks only to their con-
tract relations, and adapts its reme-
dies to the enforcement of these ;
and, if necessary for this end, it
takes hold of the debtor's effects in
the hands of other persons. In
cases like the present it does more;
for it gives a contingent lien on
those effects in advance of their
being earned."
This case was not cited, it is be-
lieved, ii, any opinion of the Su-
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preme Court until i8go, in the case
of Schroeder v. Galland, hereafter
referred to. In Mr. Miller's edition
of Sergeant's Mechanics' Lien Law,
page 75, the decision is spoken of
in this way: "If this decision be the
law, it establishes a most important
doctrine. Every person employed
by a contractor is presumed to have
seen his contract, and as against the
owner and his house, his claim
cannot rise beyond it, or depart from
its terms. We believe, however,
that this decision is not regarded in
practice or usage."
In the case of Odd Fellows' Hall
v. Masser, 24 Pa. St., 507 (1855),
the Court laid down inter alia the
following propositions:
(i) "That where materials for the
construction of a building, con-
tracted for in good faith, are deliv-
ered to the contractor for the build-
ing, a lien for the price of the ma-
terials may be filed against the
building, although the materials
were not used in the construction,
nor were of the right quality for a
specific use, if that fact was un-
known to the seller, and they were
of such a character as to justify
their use in the construction gen-
erally.
(2) "That where the materials
furnished are of the kind that would
induce a careful, prudent and skil-
ful man, acquainted with the build-
ing, to believe that they could be
used in its erection, and if they
could in fact be usefully employed
in its construction, then the ma-
terial-man is not bound to inquire
into the character of the materials
which the contractor had agreed
with the owner of the building to
use in its construction."
In Given v. The Bethlehem
Church, 'I W. N. C., 371, the Court
of Common Pleas No. 4, Philadel-
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phia County, in an opinion by EL-
COCK, J., held that where a sub-
contractor had gone on the bond of
indemnity of the principal con-
tractor to the owner against all
claims and liens for work and labor
done and materials furnished, he
could not himself file a lien ; to
this extent the opinion goes, al-
though the decision was only that
there had been error in the rejec-
tion of the bond when offered in
evidence; and the opinion also
says that a breach of the condition
of the bond would be a set-off and
good defence to the sci.fa. on the
lien.
Attention is called to the language
of TILGHMAN, C. 3., in the case of
Hinchman v. Graham, 2 S. & R.,
169, where he decided that lumber
furnished for a building, but deliv-
ered at the carpenter shop, at a dis-
tance from it, and not used in it,
gave a lien. "I was once inclined
to think that the lien might be re-
strained to the materials aclually
used in the building. But, on re-
flecti ,n, I find that such a construc-
tion is not warranted by the words
of the law, and would operate un-
justly on those who furnished the
materials; for how can they tell
the exact quantity that the building
will require, or what control have
they over the purchaser after de-
livery ?"
In the opinion in Haley v. Pros-
ser, supra, the Court said: "The
object originally, in the contempla-
tion of the Legislature, was to se-
cure those who furnished labor or
materials to a mere builder, with.
out knowing the owner, or having
the opportunity to secure them-
selves."
It has been decided, under the
Act of 1845 above quoted, that one
who does not contract directly with
the owner must furnish the par-
ticulars as to the nature or kind of
the work done, and the kind and
amount of materials furnished, as
required by the 12th Section of the
Act of 1836, supra; although one
contracting directly with the owner
need not give these particulars
when the claim is filed on a special
contract under the Act of 1845:
Russell v. Bell, 44 Pa. St., 47; Lee
v. Burke, 66 Pa. St., 336. A like
decision was rendered in Gray v.
Dick, 97 Pa. St., 142. in regard to
the similar act of March 24, 1849,
P. L., 675.
Such was the current of decision
when the case of Schroeder v. Gal-
land, 134 Pa. St., 277, came before
the Supreme Court in 189o. In this
case the plaintiff was a sub-con-
tractor under Olmsted, the general
contractor. In the written contract
between Olmsted and the husband
of the owner, made with her con-
sent, Olmsted agreed that he would
erect :'and deliver over to the party
of the first part, free of all liens
and encumbrances, or any claims
whatever that might arise under
any action of the party of the sec-
ond part, or his legal representa-
tives, under this contract, a base-
ment, two-story and steep-roof resi-
dence," etc. The contract con-
tained also the following stipula-
tions: "These payments (on the
estimates of the architect), by the
party of the first part, are to be
made to the party of the second
part, provided the wages of all arti-
sans and laborers, and all those
employed by or furnishing materi-
als to the said party of the second
part, on account of this contract,
shall have been paid and satisfied;
the party of the second part hereby
agreeing to furnish such evidence
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of payment and satisfaction if re- contract of the owner with the
quired so to do, by the party of the builder. He must conform to the
first part, prior to each payment_ original contract in all matters and
. . In case the party of the in the minutest detail, precisely as
second part fails to pay and satisfy the builder would be obliged to do.
all and every legal claim and de- It is most obvious that he cannot
mand as aforesaid against the depart, in any respect, either from
building, the said party of the the. designs, the dimensions, the
first part may, if he deems proper materials, the plans, shapes and
so to do, retain from the moneys sizes that are expressed in the origi-
due, if any, to the party of the see- nal contract; and the reason is
ond part, enough to satisfy such most manifest: He is the repre-
claims and demands, and if there sentative of the builder. He under-
be not enough due or coming, then takes to perform the contract of the
the said second party covenants and latter with the owner, either in
agrees to pay the same. Said sec- whole or in part, and of course he
ond party also agrees to pay sub- must conform to that contract in
contractors and parties furnishing every particular."
materials on account of this con- "There is no hardship to sub-
tract, pro rata, at each estimate." contractors in enforcing a provision
The Supreme Court held that the prohibiting liens against them, be-
plaintiff was not entitled to a lien. cause they are bound to know, by
In the opinion, GREEN, 3., said: necessity, all the terms of the con-
"A sub-contractor for construction tract made by their principal in any
is certainly bound to know the kind event, and they therefore know of
of building that is to be erected, the prohibition. But the owner
the materials of which it is to be has no opportunity of protecting
built, the price to be paid for it, himself, because he cannot know
and the manner and times of pay- to what persons the contract, or
ment. He cannot, under a con- portions of it, may be sub-let. He
tract for the erection of a building has done all he could do by pro-
at a cost of$i,ooo, furnish work and hibiting liens, in plain terms, in his
materials to the amount of $5,ooo. written contract; and of that pro-
He cannot furnish wood as mate- hibition all sub-contractors are
rial for the erection of a building to bound to know, and may abstain
be built of marble, or stone, or from contracting on such terms if
bricks. Nor can he furnish unsuit- they choose. We know of no good
able materials, even of a kind de- reason for giving such an extraor-
manded bythe contract, and entitle dinary privilege to sub-contractors
himself to a lien therefor. as the right to repudiate one of the
most important terms to which
"Of course, it cannot be ques- their contracts are subject, or of
tioned for a moment that a sub- taking away from an owner the
contractor who undertakes the con- right to insist upon the performance
struction, in whole or in part, of a of his contract according to its lit-
building, under a contract with the eral terms. We take away houses
principal contractor, is absolutely and lands from their owners by
bound by all the plans and specifi- means of some secret lien or trust
cations expressed in the original of which they know nothing, by
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applying the doctrine of construct-
ive notice; and it would be passing
strange for us to hold that the right
of a sub-contractor for .part of a
building is of so sacred a character
that it shall not be bound b6y the
express limitations of awritten con-
tract, under which, and by force of
which, his own contract must be
performed. His right of lien has
no existence at common law or in
equity. It is a creature of statute
alone ; but the statute confers upon
him no special prerogative to tran-
scend the most familiar principles
of the law, and to claim privileges
which are denied to all other citi-
zens in the determinatia of their
contract rights. Let it be granted
that a contractor, as well as the
owner, has power to bind the build-
ing by a lien for work and mate-
rials; we have never yet held that
he may confer that right upon a
mere sub-contractor under him
when, by the terms of his own con-
tract, he does not possess the right
himself. The question is one of
first impression. Heretofore it has
never been before us. It is with
us now, and we are at, liberty to
decide it in accordance with our
views of right and justice, and with
those principles of the interpreta-
tion and administration of contracts
between citizens which we unfail-
ingly apply in all other cases."
The following cases have been
held to be within the rule laid down
in Schroeder v. Galland:
Benedict v. Hood, 134 Pa. St.,
289.. While this case might have
been wholly rested upon the decis-
ion in Scheid v. Rapp, sufpra, the
Court expressly put it upon the
case of Schroeder v. Galland. -Here
the material clauses of the agree-
ment were as follows: "And it is
further agreed that the party of the
first part will not at any time suffer
or permit any lien, attachment or
other encumbrance, under any law
of this State or otherwise, by any
person or persons whatsoever, tV
be put or remain upon the building
or premises into or upon which any
work is -done or materials are fur-
nished under this contract, for such
work and materials, or by reason
of any other claim or demand
against-the party of the first part;
and that any such lien, attachment
or other encumbrance, until it is
removed, shall preclude any and all
claim and demand for any payment
whatsoever under or by virtue of
this contract. . .
"And further, the last instal-
ment shall not be payable, unless,
in addition to the architect's cer-
tificate, a fal release of all claims
and liens againat the said building
and its appurtenances and the said
lot of ground, for all work done and
all materials furnaihed in or about
the, construction and erection of
said building, has beei delivered
by the party of the first part, aud
unless the architect shall certify
that all damages or allowances
which should be paid or made by
the party of the first part have been
deducted from the said instalment,
and also a certificate fromthe party
of the irst part att all claims and
demands for extra work or other-
wise under or in connection with
this contract have been presented
to the architect . . .
"The payment'shall be made by
the party of the second part in
instalments, when, and in the
amounts approved by the archi-
tect: Provided, That no instal-
ment shall be less than three hun-
dred dollars, and that g margin of
twenty per cent. shall always re-
main for the final instalment; that
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is, there shall at all times be at least
twenty per cent. of the work done
which is unpaid for. And the'sub-
contractors, mechanics'and mate-
4al-men, except thosetwho have
executed the bond of Joseph C.
Pharoh, as sureties for this contract,
shall first give a release of lien for
all work done and material supplied
by them up to date of such pay-
ment."
Dersheimer v. Maloney, 143 Pa.
St, 532. This was a lien filed by a
sub-contractor. The coitiact be-
tween the owner and the principal
contractor contained the following
piovisons:
"(2) . . . Eighty-five per cent.
will be paid aA the wrk-'progresses
on labor and 'materials, in monthly
payments, according to and upon
the estimate of the architect. The
proprietor reserves the right to pay
bills, deducting fifteen per cent.
until completion: Provided, That
in each, case of payment a certifi-
cate shall be obtained from the
architect ; .... .and, provided
further, That in each case a certifi-
cate shall be obtained by the con-
tractor from the clerk of the office
where liens are recorded, signed
and sealed by the clerk, that he has
'carefully examined the records and
finds no liens or claims recorded
against said -work; neither shall
there be any legal or lawful claims
against the contractor in any man-
ner, from any source whatever, for
work or materials furnished on said
works."
"(7) The proprietori will nOt, in
any manner, be answerable or ac-
countable for loss or damage that
shall or may happen to said work
or any part or parts thereof respec.
tively, or for any of the materials
or other things used and employed
in finishing and completing 'said
works; or for injury to any person
. or persons, either, workmen or the
public, or for damages to adjoining
property." .
Tebay & Klingensmith v. Kil-
patrick & Company, Limited, i
Adv. Rep., 66. Here the contract
between the owner and principal
contractor provided that the con-
tractor should "not sub-let the
work, or any part thereof, % ithout
consent in writing of the proprie-
tors," or- owners; and also that
said owners should "not in any
manner be answerable or account-
able for . . . any of the materials
or other things used and employed
in finishing and completing said
works."
Wilkinson v. Brice, i Adv. Rep.,
481. Here the agreement con-
tained a clause identical in lan-
guage with that, first quoted from
Benedict v. Hood, supra.
. Bolton v. Hey, x Adv. Rep.,
6o8. In this case paragraph IX
of the contract provided for pay-
ment to the contractor upon the
certificate of the architect "and
upon sufficient evidence that all
claims upon the buildingfor workor
material up to the time of each and
every payment are discharged, or if
the party of the first part shall re-
quire it, either a full or partial re-
lease, at the option of and satisfac-
tory to the said party ofthe first part,
of all liens against said premises on
the part of all persons, if any, who,
up to that time, have delivered
materials for use in, or performed
work upon, the said building, and
before the final[ payment hereafter
specified shall become due, to fur-
nish to the said party of the first
part, a full, complete and perfect
release of all liens which may lie
against the building or premises on
account of work done or materials
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furnished thereto, including the
liens of the said party of the second
part."
A supplemental agreement, also
in writing and executed at the same
time, provided:
"It is further agreed that the
said building shall be built, fin-
ished and delivered over to the
party of the first part free of all
liens and encumbrances, or any
claims whatever that might arise
under any action of the party of the
second part, or his legal represen-
tatives under this contract, and that
the provisions of the ninth section
of said contract shall not be taken
to subject the said building to any
liability for the payment for labor
or materials furnished in and about
the erection thereof, or the said
party of the first part to any lia-
bility therefor, other than the pay-
ment of the contract price to the
said party of the second part as
therein provided."
Besides the principal case, the
following cases have been held not
to be within the rule of Schroeder
and Galland. Murphy v. Morton,
139 Pa., 345, where the contract
was: "'The said party of the second
part . . . . will deliver the said
houses, so completed, to the party
of the first part, free, clear and dis-
charged of and from all claims,
liens of mechanics and material-
men, and from any and all charges
whatsoever; and, to insure on his
part the performance of this part
of the contract, the party of the
second part hereby agrees to fur-
nish to the owner, at each payment
after the first payment, satisfactory
receipts, showing that the proceeds
of all preceding payments have
been devoted exclusively to paying
for materials and workmanship used
in the construction of the said pair
of houses; and, before the last or
final payment shall be due or pay-
able, the party of the second part
shall furnish the party of the first
part with releases from sub-con-
tractors and material-men, and
from any and all persons having a
right of lien or action against the
said houses, or the property on
which they are located, for any
work or materials furnished and
used in their construction."
Loyd & Company v. Xrause &
Sons, I Adv. Rep., 240. Here the
contract contained the following
clause : "Neither shall there be any
legal or lawful claims against the
party of the first part (the general
contractor) in any manner, from
any source whatever, for work or
materials furnished on said work."
In the preceding part of the same
section of the contract, there was a
provision that the last payment of
the contract price need got be made
until "'a complete release of liens
shall have been furnished by the
party of the first part."
Willey v. Topping, i Adv. Rep.,
241. Here the contractor, subse-
quent to his contract, but before
the sub-contractor furnished the
material for which he claimed a
lien, had released his right to file
a lien.
It is respectfully submitted that
these cases are not reconcilable with
each other. Take the leading case
on each side, Shroeder v. Galland
and Murphy v. Morton; what es-
sential diflerence is' there in the
language of the contracts?
It will be noticed that the doc-
trine of Shroeder v. Galland is
largely built upon the theory that
the sub-contractor is presumed to
know all the details of the contract
between the owner and the general
contractor, and is bound by all the
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terms of that contract. In the
principal case, while the facts are
stated not to bring it within Schroe-
der and Galland, yet the doctrine
of Schroeder and Galland is ex-
pressly recognized and affirmed;
but in the last paragraph but one
of the opinion the reasoning on
which Schroeder and Galland is
based is departed from. The Court
no longer says that the sub-con-
tractor "is absolutely bound by all
the plans and specifications ex-
pressed in the original contract of
the owner with the builder. He
must conform with the original
contract in all matters and in the
minutest detail, precisely as the
builder would be obliged to do. It
is most obvious that he cannot de-
piart in any respect either from the
designs, the dimensions, the mate-
rials, the plans, shapes and sizes
that are expressed in the original
contract." The Court now says,
"lHe can know, and he must take
notice, as we have seen, of the title
of the apparent owner, and of the
general character of the agreement
under which the contractor is pro-
ceeding to build. He can know,
and must take notice of, thegen-
eral chanzcter of the building, and
of the materials and labor proper
to be used in its construction. He
must see to it that the materials he
supplies are such as may be reason-
ably needed for and used about such
a building, both as to their quantity
and quality, but here his responsi-
bility ends. Subject to these quali-
fications and conditions he may
bind the building for what his ma-
terials or labor may be reasonably
worth." This sounds like a return
to Odd Fellows' Hall v. Masser,
sitfira.
Shaver v. Murdock, 36 Cal., 298,
and Henley v. Wadsworth, 38 Cal.,
356, are cited in Schroeder v. Gal-
land as deciding "that the right of
the sub-contractor to a lien is con-
trolled by the terms of the original
contract, and he is presumed to
have notice of the terms of that
contract." These decisions were
both made under the California
Act of April 26, 1862, P. L., 384,
which Act, in its first section, pro-
vides that the lien given under it
shall only be "to the extent of the
original contract price;" and, in
Section 5, that "whenever, by the
provisions of the original contract,
the payments to an original con-
tractor are to be made by instal-
ments," those claiming a lien must
give notice to the owner before the
instalment becomes due to entitle
them to any payment out of it; and,
under Section io, the owner cannot
anticipate any payment to the
prejudice of the lien claimants.
The point decided in Shaver v.
Alurdock was that the owner could
not vary his original agreement
-with his contractor so as to affect
the interests of a material-man,
without timely notice to the ma-
terial-man. Henley z. Wadsworth
decided that the owner who paid
his contractor by instalments, in
accordance. with the contract be-
tween them, and without any notice
from lien claimants, was, under the
Act, protected in so doing. It is
evident that neither of these cases
support the decision in Schroeder
v. Galland.
But in Bowen v. Aubrey, 22 Cal.,
566, it is distinctly ruled that a sub-
contractor cannot claim a right of
lien where such right has been
waived by the original contractor.
CROCKIR, J., on page 570, says:
"When an owner of property has
contracted with another to erect a
building, or other superstructure, or
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do any other work, or furnish ma-
terials therefor, all sub-contractors
and parties agreeing to furnish
labor or materials to such original
contractor do so with reference to
such original contract, in subordi-
nation to its provisions and to the
rights of the respective parties
thereto, so far as they relate to the
liability of the owner or the prop-
erty, or so far as they rely on such
liability; and any agreement such
parties may make with such origi-
nal contractor is, so far as relates
to the owner or the property, sub-
ject to 11 the terms, agreements,
conditions and stipulations of such
original contract; and the owner
or the property cannot be held
liable or bound to any extent be-
yond the terms of the original con-
tract, or such new or further con-
tract as he may make with the
original contractor or the sub-con-
tractors."
This case was decided under the
California Acts of April I9, 1856,
and April 22, 1858, which, like the
subsequent Act of 1862, seem to
contemplate that the owner can
only be called upon to pay the un-
paid balance of his contract price,
and that the sub-contractor must
know what this is and tile terms of
payment See Phillips on Mech.
Liens, 272.
See also Henry v. Rice, I8 Mo.,
App., 497 (overruled in Henry &
Coatsworth Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo.,
47); Shaw v. Stewart, 43 Kan., 572 ;
Bardwell v. Mann, 46 Minn., 285,
289.
The itatute which is undoubtedly
referred to in the opinion in the
principal case, and indicated there-
in to be unconstitutional, is the
Act of June 8, I89i, P. L., 225,
which was passed with the idea of
restoring the law to what it had
been supposed to be before the de-
cision in Schroeder v. Galland.
The two sections, of which this
Act consists, are as follows:
"Section i. Be it enacted, etc.
That no contract which shall here-
after be made for the erection of
the whole or any part of a new
building with the owner of the lot
on which the same shall be erected,
shall operate to interfere with or to
defeat the right of a sub-contractor
who shall do work or shall furnish
materials under agreement with the
'original contractor in aid of such
erection, to file a mechanics' lien
for the amount which shall be due
for the value of such work or ma-
terials furnished, unless such sub-
contractor shall have consented in
writing to be bound by the provi-
sions of such contract, with the
owner, in regard to the filing of
liens.. Without such written con-
sent of the sub-contractor all con-
tracts between the original contrac-
tor and the owner, which shall
expressly or impliedly stipulate
that no such lien shall be filed,
shall be invalid as against the right
of such sub-contractor to file the
same.
"Section 2. All persons contract-
ing with the owner of ground for
the erection or construction of the
whole 6r any part of a new building
thereon, shall be deemed the agent
of such owner in ordering work or
materials in and about such erection
orconstruction,and any sub-contrac-
tor doing such work or, furnishing
such materials shall be entitled to
file a mechanics' lien for the value
thereof within six months from the
time the said work was completed
by said sub-contractor, notwith-
standing any stipulations to the
contrary in the contract between
40
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the owner and the contractor, un-
less such stipulation shall have been
consented to in writing by such
sub-contractor."
It is suggested by WirnLr.Ms, J.,
that this statute is within the pro-
hibition of Article i, 17, of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania; and
that it might also be within the pro-
hibition of Article i, to, of the Con-
stitution of the United States. On
examining the sections of the Con-
stitutions referred to, it is evident
that the only clause which could
have been in the mind of the Judge
is the one, in identical language in
both Constitutions, prohibiting the
State from passing any "law impair-
ing the obligation of contracts."
But it needs but a moment's con-
sideration of the Act in question to
see that it cannot be held unconsti-
tutional on this ground, as the
Act, by its terms, is only applicable
to contracts made after its passage
and the inhibitions of the constitu-
tions only protect contracts made
before the passage of the law which
seeks to impair them. See Lehigh
Water Company v. Easton, 121 U.
S., 388; Hare on Constitutional
Law, page 676.
The question then arises, is the
Act in question unconstitutional
on any other ground? It will here
be necessary to consider for a
moment the general nature of
mechanics' lien laws. They are
purely statutory. They have been
accepted as reasonable by the peo-
ple, because they seem like little
more than an extension of the com-
mon law lien, which anyone has
who adds to the value of a chattel
in his possession by expending his
labor upon it. Legally their va-
lidity does not seem to have been
often called into question. The
principle upon which, when at-
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tacked, they have been supported
is well expressed by ChiefJustice
SHAw, in Donaghy v. Klapp, 12
Cush., 44o: "Before the year I85r,
no one could create such a lien bya
building contract, except the owner
or person having an interest there-
in, to the extent of such interest.
But by that statute one who had
contracted with the owner to erect
a building had. power, by his sub-
contract with another for the whole
or part of the work, to create a sim-
ilar lien on the estate in favor of
such sub-contractor. . . . Be-
fore that statute took effect as law,
the contract gave a lien to Hilt (the
original contractor) only, which
was the act of the owner charging
his own estate. But under the oper-
ation of that statute, a precisely
similar contract by the owner of
land would give the contractor a
power to bind the estate by other
liens in favor of sub contractors for
labor thereon. Such liens in favor
of such sub-contractors, would
equally bind the estate by consent
of the owner; because such a con-
tract, by force of the existing law,
when it was made, of which the
owner is presumed to be conusant,
gives his irrevocable power to his
contractor to charge and bind his
estate; and when such power is
executed by the actual making of
such sub-contract for labor, it is in
law the act of the owner hypothe-
cating his own estate to the extent
of the price of such labor." See
also Phillips on Miechanics' Liens,.
.65, and Laird v.Moonan, 32 Minn.,
358. The contractor is made the
general agent of the owner, with
authority to bind, not the owner
personally, but the building, in fa-
vor of a sub-contractor, by a lien
for reasonable and suitable materi-
als, although (in the absence of
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an express statutory provision) the
aggregate of the sub-contractors'
liens exceeds the contract price.
Such powers are, under the law, im-
plied to have been given to the
contractor by the owner. But where
the owner in his contract has ex-
pressly stated that he gave the con-
tractor no such powers, can the
Legislature declare that the con-
tractor shall, nevertheless, as to sub-
contractors and material-men, be
held to -have *such powers? And
this, even wherr the sub-contractor
has actual notice and full knowl-
edge of this provision in the cob-
tract between the owner aid the
original contractor; for, in the sta-
tute in question, the only way in
which the sub-contractor can be
held by such a provision in the
original contract is by his consent
thereto in writing.
The constitutional provisions un-
der which this Act will most prob-
ably be attacked, are the clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, which
provides that "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law;" and
the First Section of the First Article
of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
which classes among the inherent
and indefeasible rights of all men,.
that "of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property." Certainly it
may be argued with considerable
force that the effect of this Act will
be to limit the owner's enjoyment
of real estate; and to put it out of
his power to make the ordinary and
useful improvements to his property
without subjecting himself to the
risk of having it burdened with
debts which he did not personally
contract, for improvements for
which he has fully paid, and which
debts were made a lien upon the
property by the acts of one to whom
he had expressly refused to give any
power to pledge the property for the
payment of these debts, and of
which refusal the persons to whom
the debts are owing had full knowl-
edge when they contracted them.
This seems like carrying the doc-
trine of implied agency beyond all
pr6per limits.
But why invoke the doctrine of
agency at all? Cannot the Legisla-
ture say that every building erected
with the authority of the landowner
shall be subject to a Hen for work
and-materials in favor of those who
furnish them, which lien they alone
can waive? "As soon as owners
of lots ceased to be their own
builders, they put it in the power
of the persons employed by them
to occasion losses to mechanics and
material-men which they ought not
to bear; and it was to remedy this
mischief that the Legislature estab-
lished the principle that materials
and labor are to be considered as
having been furnished on the credit
of the building, and not of the con-
tractor. The principle is not only
a just but a convenient one.
Whether the builder be the agent
of the owner or an indePendent
contrador, his appointment to the
job -creates a confidence in him'
which was not h ad before; and the
consequences of a false confidence
ought not to be borne by those who
had no hand in occasioning it."
GIBsON, C. J., in White v. Miller,
i8 Pa. St., 52. This case is well
worth careful reading.
Probably the Act would be free
from objection if it had provided
that the lien in' favor of the sub-
contractor should not exist where
the original contract stipulated
against such liens and was filed or
recorded in some public office. See
